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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

BENNETT MERL BELWOOD,

Case No.

12548

Defendant-AppeUant.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND SUPPORTING BRIEF
Comes now the Plaintiff-Respondent and petitions
the Court for rehearing in the above entitled cause on the
following grounds:
The Supreme Court's ruling that the prosecution
exceed its bounds on cross-examination is erroneous on
the basis that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in allowing the cross-examination as it did.
1.

2. The Supreme Court's decision that jurors who
were opposed to the death penalty were arbitrarily excluded from appellant's trial is erroneous.
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NATURE OF THE CASE
Bennett M. Belwood was tried in the District Court
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson presiding, and found guilty of
murder in the first degree. The defendant appealed the
conviction.
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
In its opinion this Court held that the prosecution
had gone beyond the scope of defense counsel's direct
examination on its cross-examination and that a juror was
erroneously excluded. The case was remanded for a new
trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent, State of Utah, seeks to have this
Court reverse its decision and affirm the judgment of the
district court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING THAT
THE PROSECUTION EX CE E DE D ITS
BOUNDS ON CROSS-EXAMINATION IS
ERRONEOUS ON THE BASIS THAT THE
TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED
ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING THE
CROSS-EXAMINATION AS IT DID.
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Appellant took the witness stand and testified concerning his mental condition, medication he took and how
much beer he had drunk (T. 554-556).
The prosecutor cross-examined the oppellant concerning the use of medication (T. 559-561). Therein
appellant testified that he had taken about three or four
pills on July 8. The appellant further testified as follows:

THE WITNESS: The day I got my keys
locked up in the car, that was - if that was July
8th, I took three or four.
Q.

(by Mr. Banks) What time?

A. Approximately four or five.
What?
A. Approximately four or five.
Q.

Q.

A.M. or P.M.?

A. In the evening.
Q. You only took one at a time; isn't that
right?
A. No. I took three or four together.
Q.

You never did that before, did you?

A. Yes,sir.
Q. Now, all this did was relax your muscles
a little bit, didn't it?
A. More than a little bit.
Q. And calmed you down a little bit?

A. More than a little bit.
Q.

What?
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A.

More than a little bit.

Q. But that is for the purpose for what you
took this, was to calm you down a little bit wasn't
. ?
it.

'

A.

In some cases for that reason, yes.

Q. And when you took this, you didn't have
any trouble thinking, did you?
Q. Well, you had been taking this for quite
some time, hadn't you?

A.

Approximately two to three years.

Q.

Yes. And that didn't hurt your thinking

processes at any time when you took this, did it?
A. Yes.
Q.

All right, in what way?

A.

Well, it makes things seem sort of unreal.

Q.

How?

A.

Like you're drunk.

Q.

A little fuzzy?

A. More than a little fuzzy if you take three
or four at a time.
Q. After you took these, you decided to go
out and have a party, didn't you, drink a few
beers?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it didn't impair your memory to the
point you couldn't remember having twenty that
night, twenty cans of beer that night, did it?
A.

No, sir.
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Q. And you remember going out to Dugway
at about 3:00 o'clock in the morning don't you
and checking in at the gate?
'
'

A. I said it affected my memory. I didn't
say what extent it did.
MR. VAN SC IVER: Your Honor, I'm going

to object to that question. That goes beyond the
scope of direct.

The objection was overruled and cross-examination
continued. The cross-examination of the appellant Bennett M. Belwood involved facts leading up to and including the point where Belwood left the victim and returned
to Dugway (T. 574-576). The purpose of the cross-examination was not to elicit information that would go
to an issue of punishment rather than guilt or innocence.
The cross-examination went to the very heart of the direct-examination and that was what effect the beer and
drugs had on the memory of the appellant. Various individuals testified concerning the same events asked of
the appellant on cross-examination. The testimony concerning the sequence of the events and appellant's recollection of these events was valid to determine his mental
competence and his credibility.
In order for the prosecution to properly refute appellant's contentions that his memory was affected, it
was necessary to review the activities on July 8th. This
was well within the scope of cross-examination allowable
to the prosecutor.

If the appellant's objection had been allowed a
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travesty of justice would be permitted. As stated m
McCormack on Evidence:
"[T]he accused may limit his direct examination
to some single aspect of the case, such as age, sanity or alibi, and then invoke the court's ruling that
the cross-examination be limited to the matter
thus opened. Surely the according of a privilege
to the accused to select out a favorable fact and
testify to that alone, and thus get credit for testifying but escape a searching inquiry on the whole
charge, is a travesty on criminal administration.
It is supposed to be necessitated by the principle
that by taking the stand the accused subjects himself to cross-examination 'as any other witness.'
Seemingly at least two escapes are available. First,
the rule limiting the cross-examination has always
been professedly subject to variation in the judge's
discretion, and the fact that the cross-examiner
cannot call the witness is a ground for exercising
the discretion to permit cross-examination on any
relavant fact." McCormack, Evidence, pp. 49-50
(1954).
The judge is the person who has the final responsibility for conducting the trial. He should be allowed
considerable latitude of discretion with the mechanics of
procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-5 (1953), provides
in part that if a defendant offers himself as a witness he
may be cross-examined by the counsel for the state the
same as any other witness.
As stated in 3 Wharton Criminal Evidence, § 887
(1955):

"Considerable or great latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of the defendant
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even though his testimony is self incriminating.
Some courts state that an even wider or greater
latitude in the cross-examination of the accused
should be allowed than is ordinarily the case. . . .
As an application of the rule applicable to witnesses, generally the form, extent, and latitude of
the cross-examination of an accused who voluntarily offers himself as a witness are matters for the
discretion of the trial court. . . . The discretion
will not be interfered with by the reviewing court
uless there is a clear abuse thereof."

In Hopper v. State, 302 P. 2d 162 (Okl. 1956), the
defendant appealed his conviction for sodomy and objected to the scope of cross-examination. The court within
the opinion echoed the same rule of law as phrased in
Wharton by stating:
". . . Moreover, where a defendant, in a criminal
case takes the stand in his own behalf, he may be
cross-examined to the same extent as any other
witness, and the extent of the examination is a
matter within the trial court's sound discretion,
Murphy v. State, 72 Okl. Cr. 1, 112 P. 2d 438 and
will not be interfered with on appeal unless fragrantly abused." Id. at 166.
This was and is the standard to be applied in Utah.
Justice Ellett in his dissenting opinion on the original
hearing of State v. Belwood, ( # 12439, decided Feb. 29,
1972) cited from People v. Hite, 8 Utah 461 (1893),
wherein the trial court allowed the prosecution to go beyond the scope of direct. This Court in Hite stated:
"In his cross-examination the prosecuting attorney was still further back and his inquiry de-
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scended still further into particulars; he interrogated the defendant as to transactions evidently
for the purpose of testing bis recollection and of
bringing to light conduct that would affect his
credibility.
It is the duty of the juror to judge of the credibility of the witness and to weigh his testimony
in the light of his opportunities to know, to understand and remember and in view of his motives
and his moral worth as evidenced by his conduct,
and in view of his character established by his life
as well as by the light of experience and reason.
To enable the juror to judge of the credibility
of the witness, rigid cross-examinations are sometimes necessary and much latitude of inquiry
shoud be permitted. The investigation of truth
is sometimes attended with the humiliation and
disgrace of the witness and appears to be remorseless."
This principal of law was reiterated in State v.
Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229 (1936) wherein
the court stated:

" ... We think the matter (cross-examination)
should be left to the sound discretion of the court
and do not intend to lay down any rule that under
no circumstances can the defendant like any other
witness be questioned as to his acts, criminal or
otherwise. . . ." 64 P. 2d at 239. (Emphasis
added.)
The judge is the person who has the final responsibility for conducting the trial. He should be allowed considerable latitude of discretion with respect to the mechanics of procedure. Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8,
354 P. 2d 564 (1960); State v. Anderson, ( # 12527, decided March 27, 1972).

In the present action, any alleged error that may
have been committed by the prosecutor must be evaluated in conformance with Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1
(1953) which states:
"After hearing an appeal the court must give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties. If
error has been committed, it shall not be presumed
to have resulted in prejudice. The court must be
satisfied that it has that effect before it is warranted in reversing judgment."
This Court in the murder case of State v. Kelbach,
23 Utah 2d 231, 461 P. 2d 297 (1969), considered § 7742-1 with regard to the effect of evidence given by a
police officer during cross-examination. The majority opinion stated:
"[A]n appellate court must give judgment without regard to errors or defects which do not affect
the substantial rights of the parties. This court
may not interfere with a jury verdict, unless upon
review of the entire record, there emerge errors
of sufficient gravity to indicate that defendants'
rights were prejudiced in some substantial manner, i.e., the error must be such that it is reasonably probable that there would have been a result
more favorable to the appellant in the absence of
error. We cannot reasonably conclude that the
inadvertent remark by the police officer, during
cross-examination, deprived defendants of a fair
trial, since a review of the record substantiates
that defendants' guilt was conclusively proven by
competent evidence. (Citations omitted.)" 461
P. 2d at 301-302.
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The present case is no different in that there is no
conceivable way that the appellant, absent the cross-examination, would have received a result more favorable.
As the majority opinion in the original hearing stated,
the confession plus the other evidence was enough to
convict the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant failed to show the cross-examination was
not within the scope allowable under the court's discretion. Instead, appellant used pre-code case law to try
to limit the court's discretionary powers.
First, is State v. Shockley, 29 Utah 25, 80 P. 865
(1905). The court held that it was reversible error to
permit the state to cross-examine the defendant concerning previous crimes which were in no way connected with
the issue before the court. However, Utah state law and
applicable case law now permit cross-examination of defendant concerning previous felonies. See State v. Kazda,
14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 407 (1963) wherein the court
stated:
"When an accused voluntarily takes the witness stand he may be asked whether or not he has
even been convicted of a felony. Such a question
is sanctioned by statute. If the accused answers
in the affirmative he may be asked the nature of
the felony. Further, the accused may be asked if
he has been convicted of more than one felony,
and if so the type and nature thereof." 382 P. 2d
at 409.
Second, in State v. Vance, 28 Utah 1, 110 P. 434
(1910) the court did not rule upon any possible error in
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the cross-examination but reversed the case on other
grounds, 110 P. at 449.
The first case has been changed by statutory law
and the second did not rule directly upon the issue of
cross-examination. These cases are not applicable to the
case before the court. Appellant's contention is and was
groundless and the trial court correctly used its discretion
in allowing the prosecutor the latitude it did in cross-examination.
Therefore we request that this Court review its prior
decision and affirm the decision of the trial court.

POINT II.
THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION THAT
JURORS WHO WERE OPPOSED TO THE
DEATH PENALTY WERE ARBITRARILY
EXCLUDED FROM APPELLANT'S TRIAL
IS ERRONEOUS.
Appellant relied upon Witherspoon v. United States,
391 U. S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1968) as
his basis of appeal. In Witherspoon the defendant was
charged with the murder of a policeman. The prosecution
utilized an Illinois statute to challenge for cause 47 of the
96 prospective jurors, who on voir dire demonstrated
opposition to capital punishment or had scruples against
inflicting it.
The Supreme Court stated:

" [t] he tone was set when the trial judl.!e said
early in the voir dire, 'Let's get these consci:ntious
o?jectors out of the way, without wasting any
time on them.' In rapid succession, 47 veniremen
were successfully challenged for cause on the basis
of their attitudes toward the death penalty. Only
five of the 47 explicitly stated that under no circumstances would they vote to impose capital punishment. Six said that they did not 'believe in the
death penalty' and were excused without any attempt to determine whether they could nonethe·
less return a verdict of death. Thirty-nine veniremen, including four of the six who indicated that
they did not believe in capital punishment, acknowledged having 'conscientious or religious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty'
or against its infliction 'in a proper case' and were
excluded without any effort to find out whether
their scruples would invariably compel them to
vote against capital punishment." 391 U. S. 514515. (Emphasis added.)
The impact of the Witherspoon decision is that the
court considered prospective jurors to fall into three categories. Two of the three are easily distinguishable. First
there are those who have no objection to capital punishment and would vote for the death penalty. Second there
are those on the opposite side that under no circumstances
would impose or vote for capital punishment or the death
verdict. The third class are those persons who have
doubts, qualms or scruples concerning capital punishment. Witherspoon forbids the complete exclusion of this
group on the basis that to do so would produce a death
oriented jury that would not be representative of the com-
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munity. However, if a person does have qualms, doubts
or scruples that bar his being impartial, then he can be
removed for that bias.
In the case at bar, only one juror's exclusion is being
contested. The juror was not excused without any attempt to determine if her scruples, qualms or doubts
would prevent her from voting for capital punishment as
was done in Witherspoon.
To the contrary, Mrs. Maass was questioned at some
length concerning her views against the death penalty
(T. 59-62):
MR. BANKS: I'll ask you, are you opposed

to capital punishment?
MRS. MAASS: Yes.

MR. BANKS: In any instance, can you see
where a death penalty would be justified?
MR. VAN SCIVER: That's not proper.
(discussion of the objection)
THE COURT: The question may stand.
What's your answer?
MR. BANKS: I asked you if you were
opposed to capital punishment?
MRS. MAASS: Maybe I should say that I'm
opposed to it. If I don't believe in it.
MR. BANKS: Now, I'll ask you if you would
always return a recommendation of leniency if you
believed the defendant to be guilty of murder in
the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt?
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MRS. MAASS: I guess I couldn't make the
opinion until I've heard the facts.
MR. BANKS: I take it, then, in some instances you could see where the death penalty
would be justified, is that correct?
MRS. MAASS: Yes.

*

*

*

MR. BANKS: I'll ask you, with your attitude on capital punishment, would it ever prevent
you from returning a verdict of guilty of murder
in the first degree, even though you believed the
evidence supported such a charge?
MRS. MAASS:
mend leniency.

Could be. I would recom-

MR. BANKS: Let me ask you this. Knowing that a judge may not follow the recommendation of leniency, based on your attitude towards
death, would you be inclined to return a verdict
of murder in the second degree rather than a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, even
though you believed that the evidence showed a
defendant to be guilty of murder in the first degree?
MRS. MAASS: Well, I don't think so.
MRS. MAASS: I guess I'm a little bit confused ...
MR. BANKS: I'll try to make it a little siinpler. If you believed that the evidence showed
a defendant to be guilty of murder in the first degree beyond a reasonable doubt, and you
tlwt the judge might not fallow a recommendation
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of . leniency, rather than returning a verdict of
guilty of murder in the first degree, would you return a verdict of murder in the second degree because you knew that that took it out of the judge's
hands?

MRS. MAASS: Yes.
MR. BANKS:
cause, Your Honor.

I'll challenge the juror for

THE COURT: Do you want to make any
objections?
MR. VAN SCIVER: Yes, I'll except.
THE COURT: You're excused, Mrs. Maas3.
Thank you. (Emphasis added.)
The extensive interrogation plus her unreserved answer of "yes" to the final question positively shows Mrs.
Maas8 would vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to evidence that might be developed at the trial. This was not a general objection,
as in Witherspoon, but one so prejudiced that it would
destroy the neutrality requirement of Witherspoon. (Emphasis added.)
In addition to this, the court in Witherspoon did not
address itself to the issue of whether or not death-qualified jurors could be excused if their biasness would prohibit an impartial finding on the guilt-innocence issue.
Under Utah law, a challenge for implied bias may
be taken:
"If the offense charged in punishable with death,
the entertaining of such conscientious opinions
as preclude (the juror's) finding the defendant
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guilty, in which case he must neither be permitted
nor compelled to serve as a juror.'' (Emphasis
added.) Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19 (9) ( 1953) .
This is substantially different than the Illinois statute cited above. Under Utah law, mere conscientious
scruples is not enough to challenge a prospective juror.
The bias must be sufficiently strong so as to "preclude
(the juror's) finding the defendant guilty." This standard appears to be in harmony with Witherspoon, although
this specific issue was not discussed in that case as mentioned above.
However, the Nevada Supreme Court has ruled precisely on this point in Howard v. State, 446 P. 2d 163
(Nev. 1968). When this case was tried, Nevada had an
exclusion statute identical to the Utah statute cited
above.
The defendant, on appeal, alleged error in challenging prospective jurors with scruples in light of the Witherspoon case. The Court upheld the defendants' conviction and resolved the point on appeal by saying:
". . . the rationale of Witherspoon is inapposite
to the Nevada statute since the statutory purpose
is to disqualify jurors whose opinions against the
death penalty would preclude their finding the
defendant guilty. The Illinois statute considered
in Witherspoon did not involve the right to challenge nor cause those prospective jurors who stated
that their reservations about capital punishment
would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt." 466 P. 2d at
165.
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The Nevada Court affirmed this position in Bornes
v. State, 450 P. 2d 150 (Nev. 1969).
This court in the case of State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah
2d 231, 461 P. 2d 297 (1969), decided the same exact
issue before the court now. The court held the question
asked by the trial judge in his voir dire examination:

* * Since this offense is punishable by
death, if these men should be convicted of the
crime of first degree murder, do any of you jurors
entertain such conscientious opinions about the
death penalty as would preclude you[r] finding
guilty irrespective of how strong the evidence may
be concerning guilty? * * *" 461 P. 2d at
303.
"*

complied with the statutory provisions of Utah Code Ann.
77-30-19 (9) (1953). This court further added that the
statute complies with the second exclusion of footnote 21
of Witherspoon, supra, wherein the court stated:

"*

* * We repeat, however, that nothing we
say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury
from which the only veniremen who were in fact
excluded for cause were those who made it unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might
be developed at the trial of the case before them,
or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial
decision as to the defendant's guilt. * * *"
(Emphasis added.) 461 P. 2d at 303.
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Other jurisdictions have ruled upon the impartiality
issue. In State v. Wilson, 269 A. 2d 153 (N. J. 1970), the
court considered the defendant's argument that two
veniremen were excluded erroneously from the jury. The
court held that if a venireman could not affirmatively
say whether he was able to vote for the death penalty
where the circumstances warranted it, then cause for exclusion was established. The court further cited from
State v. Mathis, 245 A. 2d 20 (N. J. 1968) wherein Chief
Justice Weintraub said:
" [I] f we accept literally the juror's final statement that he could not definitely say whether he
was unable to vote for a death sentence, cause was
nonetheless established. The State is entitled to
a juror who is impartial, i. e., one who is capable
of considering whether the death sentence may
be met. Impartiality is a positive attribute. Its
presence must appear affirmatively. If a juror,
acknowledging racial, religious, or ethnic bias
against an accused, is unable to say whether he
could or could not judge the case on the merits,
he is not an impartial juror. So here, the State
is entitled to a juror who can at least assure the
court that he will judge.'' (Emphasis added.) Id.
at 248, 245 A. 2d at 26.
The court's position was reaffirmed in the case of
State v. Sinclair, 269 A. 2d 161 (N. J. 1970) wherein the
defendant argued that he was denied a representative
jury on the basis that veniremen were excluded because
of the position on capital punishment. The court made
it clear that where a juror was equivocal throughout the
voir dire, "the state was entitled to more than a juror
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who is uncertain whether he could vote for the death penalty." 269 A. 2d at 168.
The New Jersey Court in State v. Conyers, 275 A. 2d
721 (N. J. 1971) reiterated the concept that "it would
be strange to deny the state the affirmative indicia of
impartiality required with respect to the trial of issues
which constitutionally must be tried by jury." In addition, Conyers listed a few other courts that have upheld
challenges of jurors who when asked whether they could
ever consider the death penalty, answered "I do not think
I could" or answered in like terms.
"See Segura v. Patterson, 402 F. 2d 249, 251252 (10 Cir. 1969); State v. Aiken, 75 Wash. 2d
421, 452 P. 2d 232, 242-243 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Williams v. State, 228 So. 2d 377, 380-381 (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1969); Ladetto v. Commonwealth, Mass., 254
N. E. 2d 415, 416 418 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1969); Commonwealth v. Mangum, Mass., 256 N. E. 2d 297,
300 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1970); Thames v. State, 453
S. W. 2d 495, 498 (Tex. Cr. App. 1970) ; but cf.
Marion v. Beto, 434 F. 2d 29 (5 Cir. 1970) ." 275
A. 2d 732.
In view of the foregoing, the real issue is whether
or not persons challenged for cause, and excused, were
on the grounds that their scruples against capital punishment would prevent them from being impartial on the
guilt-innocence issue or merely because they voiced some
objection to the death penalty without further inquiry.
The lower court voir dire dialogue clearly supports the
conclusion that excluded jurors were excused because
they could not be impartial on the guilt-innocence issue
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and not because they were simply opposed to capital punishment. This conclusion comports with the Witherspoon
standard and thus is not grounds for petitioner's appeal
from the lower court's judgment.
Under the facts of this case and applicable statutory
law, there can be no way the exclusion of prospective
jurors number 22 was erroneous. Therefore, the respondent respectfully requests this Court to review the case
of Bennett M. Belwood and vacate its prior judgment.
CONCLUSION
The respondent respectfully submits that a careful
review of the record and the law involved clearly reveals
that the jury verdict of guilty was proper. The weight
of the evidence also proves that the trial court properly
allowed the prosecution to cross-examine the defendant
as it did. The exclusion of the juror Mrs. Maass was not
improper and comported fully with the requirements of
Utah law and Witherspoon. The respondent further submits that the Supreme Court's decision did not properly
take into account the applicable Utah statutes and pre-
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vailing case law. For these reasons, the respondent submits that the case should be reheard, reconsidered and
the decision of February 29, 1972, be vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
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